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The rise of collective bargaining among physicians was a phenomenon
of the 1970s. At present (1980), the prospects for survival of those unions
that remain in existence can best be described as uncertain. Factors such
as physicians' own sense of their professional identity, the legal impli-
cations of their supervisory status, anti-trust and labor laws, and
income levels that are already among the highest in the country threaten
the survival of existing bargaining units. Countering these pressures
are trends toward cost containment in hospitals, the possibility of
national health insurance, an increasing number of salaried physicians, and
collective movements among hospital house staffs (interns, residents, and
clinical fellows).
This chapter explores the current status of physicians unions and
explains why they sprang up after 1970, the legal and practical consid-
erations responsible for their present uncertain position, and prospects
for their future. Fee-for-service physicians, salaried physicians, and
house staffs will be discussed separately, because their legal, profes-
sional, and social positions in the health care industry are, as we
will show, quite different.
Physicians are the highest paid professionals in the United States.
Their incomes and perquisites are admired by some, resented by others,
and deemed appropriate by most of the general public. In 1976
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physicians in the United States averaged $59,544 in net income. Until
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recently, the vast majority of M.D.s were paid on a fee-for-service
basis. Over the last 15 years, however, many publicly owned and run
health facilities have hired physicians on salary. In addition, private
institutions, both for- and non-profit, and including such facilities
as nursing homes, health maintenance organizations, and for-profit
hospitals, often pay fixed incomes to doctors. This trend has arisen
as part of the institutions' cost containment strategies. Not surpris-
ingly, it has served as a motivation for collective organization among
physicians.
Among house staff, interns in particular, traditional incentives
to organize are clearly present. Internship involves both patient care
and educational activities; an internship is necessary for qualification
for the examination to practice medicine. (Residents and clinical
fellows, the other constituents of the house staff, choose these
optional continuations in order to acquire a specialty skill.) Interns
are low paid, relative to their skills and importance to the operations of the
hospital; they work long hours, often unscheduled and unpredictable;
they are subject to both job and educational discipline, since they
have not yet attained physician status; and they have little voice in
the policies and processes of the hospital. Though they perform many
of the same services to patients as regular staff physicians, they are
compensated by yearly stipends that are always far less than a
staff physician would receive for the same services.
Nonetheless, as with physicians unions in general, there have been
only isolated organizing drives by groups of interns (usually with
residents and clinical fellows); there is nothing among house staffs or
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physicians that could be called an industry-wide drive for unionization.
Legislative inconsistencies are no doubt responsible for many of the
difficulties facing organizing efforts among physicians and house
staffs. Before looking in some detail at the history of these efforts,
it is worthwhile to set out the causes of physicians' incentives to
unionize.
The initial growth of physicians unions had its roots in the ero-
sion of the fee-for-service role traditionally held by U.S. physicians.
Since the mid-1960s, government intervention, third-party health
insurance company pressures, and hospital managerial policies have
significantly limited the professional and economic independence of the
profession. The American Medical Association (AMA), surprisingly
and no doubt unwittingly, also played a key role. Professional associ-
ations of physicians, such as the AMA, state medical societies, and
specialty organizations, have existed for over one hundred years in
the United States. Historically, their function was primarily to set
and police standards of education and training, encourage professional
development, and act as censuring bodies for physicians who did not
act in the best interest of patients.
But these associations became more political in nature as a
response to the federal government's increasing involvement in the
business of health care. This involvement began in the late 1940s,
when the government passed legislation to finance capital expansion in
hospitals (the Hill-Burton Act); it continued in the 1960s with increased
funding for the education and training of physicians, nurses, and other
health professionals. But the government's major threat, as perceived

by the medical profession, was its enactment of Medicare and Medicaid
legislation, which provides federally sponsored care for the poor and
aged.
The AMA, perhaps understandably, was opposed to the enactment of
this legislation. Conservatives in the Association were concerned to
preserve their heretofore unchallenged economic independence. The AMA
finally came around to supporting Medicare/Medicaid on the condition
that the fee-for-service principle remain in effect for these federal
reimbursements. In this, the Association was successful. However, its
adamant opposition to federally sponsored care apparently alienated a
great number of younger physicians who were educated and entering
practice in the 1960s and 1970s. This cohort, opposed to the conserva-
tive stance of the AMA, responded by not joining its ranks. According
to the AMA's files, in the 1950s over 55 percent of medical school
graduates joined the Association; by the 1960s this percentage had
dropped to between 35 and 40 percent; in 1975 only 16 percent of these
graduates joined. Though part of this drop is no doubt attributable
to the tendency of younger physicians to join specialty societies
instead of the AMA, the fact remains that the more liberal young physi-
cians were alienated by the Association's lack of social concern, as
evidenced by its bitter, strenuous lobbying against the passage of
4
Medicare and Medicaid.
Meanwhile, the more conservative among the physician population
also turned against the AMA, feeling that their independence had been
weakened by the Association's capitulation to this legislation.
Ironically, the AMA lost the memberships of both its liberal and its
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conservative supporters. Both groups turned their organizational
loyalty to local medical associations; a few began at the same time
to entertain thoughts of collective organization. Physicians organiza-
tions, called unions, federations, or guilds began to form. Bognanno's
1975 survey indicated that at least 16,000 physicians were members in
some 26 labor organizations, some of which had National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) certification. These organizations faced substantial
difficulties, primarily in the form of legislative inconsistencies
posed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and its regulatory
board (the NLRB), as well as from anti-trust laws. Physicians work
either as independent fee-for-service professionals or as staff physi-
cians, on salary with a hospital or other medical facility. In order
to be protected under the NLRA's provision for union recognition and
bargaining rights, organized workers have to fall under the definition
of "employee" that exists in the Act and in subsequent judicial decisions
Even the most liberal interpretation of employee, however, could not
apply to fee-for-service physicians, and it is ^ery difficult for staff
physicians to be defined as employees. The profit motive of some of
these bargaining units, and physicians' already high incomes, have also
inhibited success in gaining NLRB certification.
For instance, the Union of American Physicians (UAP), which does
not have certification, had as one of its goals a $100,000 per year
salary for seasoned practitioners. Though it has claimed to represent
8000 of California's 40,000 M.D.s, legal problems have prevented the
UAP from representing any fee-for-service physicians. It has been able
to offer its members mainly a "grievance procedure," which is simply
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an organized force, mainly lawyers, who collect unpaid insurance and
Medicare/Medicaid bills. It has also negotiated two contracts for
physicians on salary in two small facilities in the state.
Most early organizing drives owed their success to the energy and
dedication of strong leaders. Most notable among these are Harold
Yount of the American Physicians Guild, Kenneth Burton of the American
Physicians Union, Sanford Marcus of the Union of American Physicians,
and Stanley Peterson of the American Federation of Physicians and
Dentists. However, their efforts often failed to sustain the union in
the face of NLRA limitations. A typical experience is the one of a
group of physicians on staff at a Nevada hospital. They formed a union
in 1972, which, though it did not get NLRB certification, did affiliate
with a national union. The efforts of their leader. Dr. Holmes, brought
them some successes; most notably they won a $50/hour reimbursement
fee for all time spent in committee work. But once Dr. Holmes stepped
down, because of illness, the organization dissolved,
o
A survey by Reynolds in 1976 , which was supplemented by a tele-
phone survey we conducted in 1979, revealed that at least a substantial
portion of the organizations mentioned in the Bognanno survey of 1975
have disappeared. Those groups that have survived will face difficulty
maintaining their legal bargaining status.
Of course, it is not necessary for physicians to be protected by
the NLRA in order to organize to act collectively. But recognition
under the Act is their only protection from federal anti-trust laws.
A collective action by a group of independent contractors or by any
intrastate group against an organization with interstate connections
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( insurance companies, for example) v;ou1d be subject to prosecution under
the Sherman Act as a "conspiracy in restraint of trade." Only official
ratification under the NLRA can protect a labor organization from anti-
trust prosection. Any statewide efforts, even though they were
contained within a single state, might still be subject to federal
9
prosecution. Even collective activities that do not cross state lines
or involve more than a single employer, and which thus could possibly
escape federal anti-trust provisions, might come up against various
state anti-trust laws.
Aside from these legal problems, the general tenor in the United
States, of imposing constraints on rising hospital costs (which,
according to the Consumer Price Index, have been surpassed in cost
increases only by oil), also contributes to the public forces opposing
collective organization by physicians. Public opinion seems firmly
attached to the belief that unionization necessarily increases earnings.
Some fee-for-service physicians have begun to form corporations,
combining a number of physicians into an organization that then contracts
with one or more hospitals for services of its members. Clearly,
these are not unions in the sense of labor laws. Thus they remain a
target for anti-trust prosecution, should their pricing policies be
deemed in restraint of trade.
Any chance to unionize in the traditional sense of the word falls
to the cohorts of physicians who work on salary for a hospital (or
part-time with several hospitals) and other health facilities. However,
these groups too have recently met with legal setbacks. A recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision ( NLRB v. Yeshiva University , 78-857) cast a
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shadow over prospects for NLRB certification of "professional"
bargaining units. Though this decision was made with regard to uni-
versity professors, the implications for health-care professionals are
undeniable. Like professors, physicians supervise and manage workers
in their institutions and influence policy and promotion decisions;
thus they can be excluded from coverage by the NLRB's jurisdiction.
As we said above, house staffs, especially interns, have many of
the traditional incentives to unionize: low pay, long hours, and little
voice in policy making. But several factors work against organization.
Interns are only temporarily in this uncertain position (usually one
year); their prospects for more autonomy and higher earnings are great,
and they have a professional identity that has not traditionally been
associated with that of organized workers.
Not surprisingly, drives to organize groups of interns have been
isolated. They have also come under a great deal of scrutiny by the
NLRB and state-level labor sanctioning bodies. In 1974 Public Law
93-360 amended the Taft-Hartley Act of 1974 to remove the exemption of
voluntary hospitals from the National Labor Relations Act (1935), thus
extending labor relations protection to all employees of health care
institutions not under government or public ownership. The question of
whether or not the house staff (interns in particular) are students
(since they take courses), employees (since they are paid), or managers
(since they supervise nurses, among others) has been controversial
until quite recently. Unions of house staffs have been formed,
certified by state labor boards, and then decertified by the NLRB
(based on the fact that these members were students, not employees).
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In late 1979 a Congressional committee tried to make clear that it had
intended the 1974 amendments to Taft-Hartley to cover hospital house
staffs, only to have its amendment defeated by the House of Representa-
tives.
Prior to the passage of the 1974 amendments, the Physicians
National Housestaff Association (PNHA) was formed "to organize the
house staffs in hospitals throughout the U.S." They met with little
success. In New York City the Committee of Interns and Residents (CIR)
was formed and represented (as an association, not a union) approx-
imately 5000 house staff in New York hospitals. CIR's primary demands
were restriction on hours and "out of title" work. Hospital management,
united in the League of Voluntary Hospitals (a loose association of
New York hospitals) was opposed to any contractual arrangement. No
attempt was made to gain official sanction of CIR as a bargaining agent,
though a four-day strike in 1975 led to a compromise settlement.
Similarly, in 1975 in Chicago, the 450 member Cook County Hospital
Housestaff Association struck and subsequently signed an agreement
limiting work hours to 80 per week and establishing a committee to
discuss patient care issues.
These organizing efforts of the 1970s began meeting setbacks as
early as 1976, when the NLRB dismissed (by a 4-1 vote) a petition by
the Ceders-Sinai Housestaff Association in Los Angeles to have their
organization recognized by the NLRA. The Board ruled that house staff
were not employees, but students. The dissenting vote argued that
the relationship between student and employee is not mutually exclusive,
since students are not among the exclusions listed from the definition
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of employee under section 2 (3) of the Act. Though this gave hope to
some house staff organizations, and kept isolated movements toward
official recognition alive, the NLRB subsequently ruled against union
representation elections in two additional hospitals. In the state of
Massachusetts, however, the Labor Commission ruled the other way,
12
allowing an election under Massachusetts law in April 1976.
Because of the different interpretations by state bodies and the
NLRB, the U.S. Circuit Court considered a case in which the issue was
whether house staff working in non-profit hospitals in New York could
be covered by New York State labor relations law, instead of national
law. The Court's ruling was that federal law did not supersede state
in this case; house staff labor relations were not within the juris-
diction of the NLRB. In a further turn of events, the U.S. Court of
Appeals reversed the Circuit Court's decision. The battle continued
with a bill sponsored in the U.S. Congress that would mandate inclusion
of house staff under the bargaining laws. Though this bill was expected
to pass, it was soundly defeated in late 1979, For now, the issue is
settled: house staff will not be considered employees within the
meaning of the national labor laws and are therefore excluded from
NLRA coverage.
Summary
The three separable cohorts of physicians (fee-for-service,
salaried, and house staff) have each met legal opposition to any
attempts to organize and bargain collectively. Fee-for-service
physicians are most clearly outside the criteria for organization,
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since they are independent entrepreneurs who could not be represented
as a collective unit, according to the NLRA, even if they deemed this
route the appropriate method for maintaining their rather privileged
positions. Salaried physicians, though possessing a commonality of
interest under the definition of an appropriate bargaining unit, have
been severely limited by the recent NLRB v. Yeshiva decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court, which maintained that professional employees are
essentially managers and cannot organize collectively. For house
staffs, the recent defeat of a bill to include them under the provisions
of the NLRA precludes further attempts to organize in this area.
Though movements for unionization in the medical profession have
not been long-lived, they have been significant for pointing out
inequities in the treatment of hospital house staff. They have, however,
failed to arouse public sympathy for the problems of the salaried or
fee-for-service physician; the attemptsof these latter groups to organize
have met with only fleeting success. The passage of national health
insurance in this country is probably the only factor that could breathe life
into physician unionization. Unless such insurance becomes a reality, col-
lective organizing will remain dormant, if not moribund, among physicians
in the United States.

12-
NOTES
1. Medical Economics , September 18, 1978.
2. Barry Eisenberg, "Trends in Physicians' Income, Expenses and Fees," in
Profile of Medical Practice (Monroe, Wisconsin: American Medical
Association), 1979, p. 71.
3. Sanford Marcus, "The Purposes of Unionization in the Medical Profession:
The Unionized Profession's Perspective in the United States," Interna -
tional Journal of Health Services , vol. 4, no. 1, 1975.
4. Medical Economics , May 23, 1970.
5. M. Bognanno, et al
.
, "Physicians' and Dentists' Organizations: A
Preliminary Look," Monthly Labor Review , June 1975, pp. 33-35.
6. "Private Physicians Unions: Federal Antitrust and Labor Law Implications,"
20 UCLA Law Review , 983, 1973.
7. "The Time has Come to Bargain for Higher Income," Medical Economics ,
March 17, 1975.
8. "Is the Doctor Union Movement Dead?", Medical Economics , August 23, 1976.
9. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar , 43 U.S.L.W. 4723 (U.S. June 16, 1975),
where the court found that state professional societies can indeed be
subject to federal prosecution for "conspiring to benefit the economic
interests of their members."
10. The physicians dealing with the Kaiser Permanente Health Plan in
California operate under this type of organization.
11
.
Ceders-Sinai Medical Center (Los Angeles, California) v. Ceders-Sinai
Housestaff Association , 31-RC-2983, June 10, 1976, 224 NLRB, No. 90,
92 LRRM 130 3.
12. See MCR-2153, April 29, 1976, Massachusetts Labor Relations Rppnrter.
vol. 2, 1143.



